Abstract-This paper develops an approach to the capture most famous aspect of poker is the use of deception in the and measurement of the information contained in opponents' form of bluffing and slowplaying to mislead opponents about bet actions in seven card stud poker. We develop a causal model ones actual hand strength. Bluff The model can be inverted to infer probability distributions runeconteofata hand value,ohower ts leads to over possible downcards from bet actions, given knowledge of perplexing tradeoffs, efforts to outguess opponents, and all opponents' bet policies. For experimental purposes, we propose manner of psychology.
I. INTRODUCTION
and Al game interest is Texas Hold'em. We believe our
Simply by virtue of compounding complexity, natural and formulation and results to be broadly applicable, but we focus simulated mechanistic worlds present many unconquered on seven card stud because this game presents a particularly challenges for modeling and reasoning by artificially intelli-rich texture of possible outcomes and knowledge disclogent systems. The challenges become vastly more difficult sure as players' individual hands evolve through successive with the introduction of other intentional agents. If you rounds of dealing (known as "streets"), each accompanied think it's a challenge to keep weeds and bugs out of your by rounds of betting. garden, try fending off gophers, squirrels, and raccoons. A Our initial objective is simply to measure the information major goal for Artificial Intelligence in games is to develop conveyed by bet actions, in comparison to the information ways to exploit the information conveyed by the behavior of offered by the visible cards alone. To do so requires the intentional opponents. Opponents' actions are typically based development of a great deal of apparatus modeling the on knowledge, beliefs, goals, and plans the subject player is relationship between dealt cards and sensible betting actions, not privy to. But with sufficient wisdom, these actions can and this necessarily involves modeling of rational players' be "read" to gain information about the opponents' hidden decision-making processes to some rudimentary degree. The states.
framework will accept more sophisticated opponent models The game of poker deals a prototypical example. The as they are developed. objective state of the game consists of possession of cards, The paper proceeds as follows. Through the imaginary some of which are held privately, and some of which are game of "face-up poker", Section II reviews the logic of known to other players. Play decisions (bet/fold actions) are correct betting in poker, and it develops a forward causal made on the basis of perceived relative hand strength; knowl-model relating held cards to bet actions. The model extends edge about opponents' hands beyond that objectively visible directly to true poker in which some cards are hidden. through displayed cards is of immense value. The structure of Section III describes how the model can be inverted to infer betting in poker is designed such that player actions convey probability distributions over opponents' possible downcards, informlation about their undisclosed cards. Stronger hands given opponent models of those players' betting policies. are incented to bet more heavily, but to do so broadcasts this Section IV introduces a simple form of such betting policies, information, so that opponents may exploit the telegraphed and calls out two useful instances, the "honest player" who knowledge to better decide on their own plays. Hence the bets only by value, and a simple default deceptive player who hands) the probability that player i's final showdown hand will beat all others is the conjunction Fig. 1 . Hand type probability distributions (htpds) showing the probability of events that his final hand type ht beats each other player of achieving a final showdown hand, at stages 3B (following betting on 3rd street) and 5D (following the deal at 5th street), for the sample game of j, summed over all hand types k, weighted by the probability Figure 8 The final sum term in (l) assumes that hand types are rank ordered from worst (htk', = 2-3-4-5-7) to best (htk',,,,l = ROYAL-STRAIGHTFLUSH).
allodds whlch assumes that In addition to the current pot size, Figure 1 shows the htpds for two stages of the sample all currently active players contribute to the pot one bet per poker game whose game history is given in Figure 8 . street, through successive streets to showdown.
Correct betting logic seems straightforward. Any player Thus a model for the causal structure of betting in face-up whose probability of showing the winning hand is greater poker is shown in Figure 2 . A player's bet action depends than 1/N should bet or raise, where N is the number of on the effective odds, number of active players, and on their active players. Any player whose probability of winning is probability of winning at showdown. Probability of winning greater than their effective odds should not bet or raise, but depends on their and their opponents' htpds. Htpds depend they should check or call. Effective odds e is the ratio of on cards held and cards available to be dealt. the amount a player will have to contribute to the pot, to the This causal chain may be extended to true poker in which final pot. Money already in the pot justifies calls by players some cards are held privately. In seven card stud, the first who have lower probabilities of winning. The more money two and the seventh street cards are dealt face-down. Figure  already Suppose that we know the opponent intimately, such that that has been dealt face up to any player. Additionally, every for any pair of downcards, plus observed upcards (both player knows their own two downcards (or three at 7th street) showing and folded) and remaining active players (we refer which rule out their inclusion in any opponent's pdd. The to this state information as the table, t), we know the goal of reading opponents' cards through their bet actions probability that in this situation they will execute a particular amounts to differentially weighing the remaining 'pdd entries bet action bj : bj C {check, bet} if bet-toj -O;bj c so as to reflect each opponent's apparent hand strength.
{fold, call, raise} if bet-toj > 0. In other words, if they Given player j's possible downcard distribution pddj, hold downcards dcl and the bet to them is zero, we know htpdj is computed by integrating the htpds over possible the probability that they will check versus bet, or, if an earlier downcard pairs 1, weighted by each pair's probability pddj,1: player has already opened betting, we know the probability that they will fold vs. call vs. raise. Let us express this htpd3 =E p(pdd3,1 )hptd(pdd3,1 X upcar7ds3) (2) knowledge as pt(bjldcl),
Obviously this operation can be computationally expensivuso thin operactice itn is eportantitonhav efi-the probability that opponent j will perform bet action bj ing a bet (as opposed to checking or calling) tend to opponent j winning at showdown, given the downcards they reweigh more heavily the possible downcard pairs that would hold, as a random variable wino that isolates their betting offer that opponent a greater chance of winning given policy from their estimate of the overall strength of their their upcards. Moreover, raises and re-raises weigh stronger hand. The complex situation embodied in the term, table, t in downcards more heavily still, through an additional mecha-(3) decomposes now into two simpler terms, one containing nism. Because the model has every player re-estimating the effective odds and number of active players, and the other strength of every other players' hand afterevery action, when relating to the player's chances of winning at showdown Player A bets, every other player will necessarily increase according to the cards remaining to be dealt from the deck, their belief that Player A has strong cards, which in tum and estimates of other players' hand strengths. decreases their beliefs in their own chances of winning. This
The term p(winldcl) was discussed in Section II; this is narrows the pool of possible downcards that any player must the probability of winning under the htpd computed from hold to meet Player A's strength. So if Player B then goes the downcards dcl, the upcards, and the remaining deck. All on to raise or re-raise anyway, then for all of the players that remains to express the factored opponent model is to trying to estimate what Player B must be holding, (modulo define the opponents' betting policy as a function of their bluffing) only the much stronger possible downcards for B probability of completing the winning showdown hand, the will gain significant probability mass through the application effective odds e, and number of other active players N. This of equation 4. form of representation for player betting policy is shown In a simpler game model and different network architec-by example in Figure 4 . The different regions of Figure 4a ture, a Bayesian view of uncertainty and opponent modeling represent probability of check vs. bet, while the different in poker was taken by Korb et. al. [9] . Following the tradition regions of Figure 4b represent probability of fold vs. call of Bayesian networks where conditional probabilities are vs. raise. Different styles of play may be interpreted as straightforwardly represented by transition matrices, their different shapes of these bet policy graphs. An interpretation work was designed for the probabilities to be acquired and of tight play would be a shift of the fold/call boundary to modified by learning; a consequence however was a struggle the right, corresponding to a requirement for a greater chance with the curse of dimensionality due to the combinatoric of winning to stay in the hand; aggressive play would shift complexity of the game.
the check/bet and call/raise boundaries to the left. "Honest" For heads-up Hold'em games, Southey et. al. used players who bet only for value would shrink to zero the bluff Bayesian inference to select opponent models from a plau-and slowplay probability regions, while very deceptive styles sible prior distribution of models after relatively few ob-of play would increase these. servations [14] . Opponent hand strength was not modeled Clearly, this is a vast simplification of the betting strategy directly, but, for a simplified version of Hold'em it could used by advanced players, and it is dumb in the Al sense be inferred from opponents' bet behavior after sufficient that it relies heavily on calculation while it lacks strategy. training. Because of the size of full heads-up Hold'em Notably, this model fails to maintain a stance throughout a poker, extension to the full game required simplification of hand (e.g. a sustained bluff), or to decide how to bet based the model. Nonetheless, intelligent responses to differential on anticipated responses of other players, such as planning opponent play of their partially hidden hands could be and execution of check-raise maneuvers. demonstrated.
Nonetheless, we assert that the proposed factored betting policy model approximates a baseline default player model IV. SIMPLE MODEL FOR RATIONAL BETTING BEHAVIOR that is suitable for the purposes of this study, which is to gain
The opponent knowledge function (3) may be quite com-insight into the quantity and value of information gained by plex and difficult to discern. We propose to model it by exploiting knowledge of opponents betting behavior. More appealing to the forward causal model for betting expressed sophisticated modeling of betting behavior as represented by in Figure 3 . While the table situational factor t can be quite (3) may be substituted cleanly into the framework devised complex, significant elements will always be found in the here, and is left for future work. two key parameters, probability of winning and effective As a technical matter, it is useful to apply a simple odds. Generally, any halfway decent player will fold most transformation in the definition of the policy graphs. Default of their losing hands (i.e. hands whose chances of winning betting policy is expressed as a function of three variables, are below the effective odds) (while perhaps bluffing with probability of winning, effective odds e, and number of active a few), raise their winning hands (i.e. hands whose chances players, N. Instead of defining a separate pair of graphs 14244-0464-9/06/$20.O0 2006 IEEE. The experiment is instrumented with the omniscient view of every player's downcards, hence their true htpds. The 1AlI seven card stud poker games discussed in this work used the experimental subject is the public knowledge observer. The following fixed limit betting structure: Ante: .25; Bringin: .25; 3rd & 4th streets: 1.0; 5th, 6th & 7th street: 2.0; maximum four raises per street. There public knowledge observer maintains estimated pdds, htpds, is no house rake. and chances of winning for every player, but it lacks knowl-3-edge of any downcards. Each player possesses slightly more Bits log g2nrnlive players information than the public knowledge observer (namely that -ad------rds-only player's two downcards), but the public knowledge observer One way of interpreting the entropy is this. For any game carns-pi.s-selsovre outcome, if the known probability of player i winning is pi, ranis-only then the Shannon theoretical optimum amount of information required to communicate that game's eventual outcome is Fig. 6 . Information gain results.
-log2(pi). The entropy is the average of this, i.e. the average information required to communicate outcomes sampled from the distribution p. The thin solid red line is the log2 of the number of players, If instead one possesses an imperfect estimated probability which corresponds to the average information cost when all of winning distribution, q, then the average information cost active players are believed equally likely to win. The dashed of transmitting the outcome of games is -Eipi log92 qi. lines are information measures for the cards-only and betThe difference between this quantity and the actual entropy inference conditions. These are simply the entropy added gauges the amount of information lost by the distribution q to the K-L distance for these conditions. The information as compared to the true distribution p; this is the Kullback-advantage of exploiting players' bet actions is reflected in Leibler divergence, the lower positioning of the cards-plus-bet-inference curve with respect to the cards-only curve.
Figure 6 averages these measures over the 1827 simulated If q represents any agents' imperfect estimates about the games. Game stages are included in the average only when uncertain outcome of the game, the K-L divergence tells how they include at least two active players. To give a sense far this estimate is from the optimal estimate reflected in the of the diversity of games over which the average is taken, true entropy H. Figure 7 plots the entropies of a subsample of individual games. In any individual game the entropy, or uncertainty VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS about which player will win if they stay through showdown, In simulated games, we may compute the K-L divergence tends to decrease. But by the luck of the cards, this can between the omniscient probability for each player winning, increase if a player suddenly catches a very good card. On p, and the estimated distribution q under two conditions. The average, however, the entropy decreases except at stage 6B. cards-only condition updates public knowledge pdds only By 6th street, in most games, most players have folded. The by pruning possible downcards as they are dealt face up simulated players are smart enough to fold if it appears clear and hence removed from the deck. This condition gives rise that they have little chance of winning, that is, if the entropy to public knowledge probability of winning distributions qc for the game is probably low and they are on the losing that ignore bet actions. The bet-inference condition prunes end. Therefore most low entropy games are concluded by pdds in this way, but additionally uses players' bet actions Stage 6B and the average entropy over remaining live games to reweigh the public knowledge pdds as described in Section increases.
III giving rise to prob-win distributions qb that are informed
The numbers below the graph of Figure 6 tabulate the by bet actions and perfect opponent models.
following quantities: the number of games still going at Results for 1827 simulated games are plotted in Figure that stage so included in the average; average log number 6. The horizontal axis represents ten distinct information players; average entropy; average K-L distances under the stages of a seven card stud game. Stages 3D, 4D, 5D, 6D, two conditions; and fractional information gain obtained by 7D measure information immediately following dealing of exploiting opponents' bet actions, as opposed to calculating cards, while stages 3B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 7B occur following a prob winning based only on dealt cards. The greatest percentround of betting. The thick solid green line (lower solid line) age gain is at Stage 6B, immediately following the betting is the entropy of the probability of winning distribution pi. at sixth street, when the bet-inference public knowledge 3 simply because the cards-only and cards-plus-bet-inference Bits >curves look similar to the naive log2 N curve in comparison to the true entropy. These curves were generated from simulated games whose players followed tight-aggressive 2 deceptive bet policies dictated by Figure 5, Figure 8 . The htpds at these stages are shown in Figure 1. their bet actions. In other words, the pdd re-estimation procedure exploiting opponents' bet actions was omitted for these players. The remaining four players were provided Bet activity @ street 3 4 5 Net won/lost Cards this information; their opponent models used to infer hand It is well known that poker winAose outcomes occur with Fig. 8 . Game history for a sample game whose entropy is plotted in red high variance. Over 8977 simulated games, the resulting in Figure 7 . Notation: "." denotes lead actor at each street; "B": Bring-in winAose rates are shown in Figure 9 . The four bet-inference bet; "k": check (no one checked in this particular game); "b": bet; "f': fold; players won on average .14 bets/game, while the three cards-*-c"-call *- tie between two or more players occurred in poker. This paper has introduced a framework for doing so in a few games.) a way that delineates the roles of exposed cards, calculation
An interesting feature of Figure 6 is that the cards-only and comparison of possible hand outcomes, rational bet condition for predicting game outcome actually performs strategy, styles of play, opponent models, and knowledge worse than chance at seventh street. This is an indication and belief carried by players and observers. Using this that if a player remains in the game while their four upcards apparatus, we have obtained experimental results quantifying show a weaker hand than opponents', then this player must information gain and its implications for winAose rate by have a strong hand hidden. The cards-only estimation of hand simulated deceptive players who possess perfect models of strength has no way of accounting for this, while the bet-their opponents' betting policies. inference condition successfully makes this inference in the To extend these results to live poker games would raise course of the pdd reestimation procedure described in Section several major challenges.
III.
First, unless studies could be conducted from behind the It would be a mistake to read Figure 6 
